Commodity Trading Advisors (CTA) gir råd og tjenester relatert til handels - og investeringsstrategier ved bruk av terminkontrakter og opsjoner på terminkontrakter på et bredt spekter av fysiske varer som landbruksprodukter, skogsprodukter, metaller og energi, samt derivatkontrakter på finansielle instrumenter som indekser, obligasjoner og valutaer. Hver CTA er preget av sin respektive handelsstrategi og markedene den handler. CTA er regulert av USAs føderale regjering gjennom registrering med Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) og medlemskap i National Futures Association (NFA). CTAs ytelsesinformasjon presentert på ctaperformance ble utarbeidet av Equinox Fund Management, LLC, basert på informasjon gitt av hver respektive leder av råvare futures og valutahandelsprogrammer sporet av Equinox Fund Management og dets tilknyttede selskaper. CTAs ytelsesinformasjon inneholder ikke mening eller analyse av Equinox Fund Management eller noen av dets tilknyttede selskaper, og fullstendigheten og nøyaktigheten av resultatinformasjonen som er rapportert til Equinox Fund Management, kan i alle tilfeller ikke verifiseres uavhengig av hverandre. Vær oppmerksom på at CTA-ytelsen ikke kan reflektere over den faktiske fondets ytelse. Velg en leder Beach Horizon LLP Horizon-programmet (Composite) BH-DG Systematisk Trading LLP Systematisk handelsprogram Campbell Company Managed Futures Portefølje Chesapeake Capital Corporation Diversifisert program Crabel Capital Management, LLC Flerproduktprogram Doherty Advisors, LLC Relativ verdi - Moderat Emil van Essen , LLC Multi Strategi Program Emil van Essen, LLC Spread Trading Program FORT, LP Global Contrarian Program FORT, LP Global Diversified Program H2O Asset Management Force 10 JE Moody Company, LLC Commodity Relativ Verdi Program KeyQuant SAS Key Trends Program Quantica Capital AG Managed Futures Program Kvantitativ investeringsstyring Global program QuantMetrics Capital Management, LLP Quantmetrics Multi Strategy Fund Quest Partners, LLC Tracker Index Program Red Oak Commodity Advisors, Inc. Fundamental Trading Program Rosetta Capital Management, LLC Rosetta Trading Program Transtrend BV Diversifisert Trend Program - Forbedret Risiko (USD) Winton Capital Ma nagement, Ltd. Futures Program Securities tilbys gjennom Equinox Group Distributors, LLC, medlem FINRA. 47 Hulfish Street, Suite 510, Princeton, NJ 08542 1.877.837.0600 Det er betydelige risikoer og potensielle interessekonflikter forbundet med forvaltede futures-programmer. Suksessen til en investering i et slikt program er avhengig av en handelsvarerådgivers evne til å identifisere lønnsomme investeringsmuligheter og vellykket handel. Identifisering av attraktive handelsmuligheter er vanskelig, krever ferdigheter og innebærer en betydelig grad av usikkerhet. Den høye innflytelsesgraden som ofte kan oppnås i futures trading, kan fungere mot deg så godt som for deg, og kan føre til store tap. Returnerer generert fra en CTAs trading, om noen, kan ikke tilstrekkelig kompensere deg for de forretningsmessige og økonomiske risikoene du antar. Du kan miste alt eller en betydelig del av investeringen. Administrerte terminsregnskap kan bli gjenstand for betydelige kostnader for ledelses - og rådgivningsavgifter. Det kan være nødvendig for kontoer som er gjenstand for disse kostnadene å gjøre betydelige handelsgevinster for å unngå uttømming eller utmattelse av deres eiendeler. CTAer kan handle svært illikvide markeder, eller på utenlandske markeder, og kan ikke være i stand til å lukke eller oppveie posisjoner umiddelbart etter forespørsel. Du kan ha markedseksponering selv etter at CTA har en forespørsel om nedleggelse eller likvidasjon. SENESTE PRESTASJON ER IKKE NØDVENDIG INDIKATIV FOR FREMTIDIGE RESULTATER. DET ER RISIKO AV TAP. Du kan miste penger i et ledet program. Copyright 2017, Equinox Fund Management. Alle rettigheter forbeholdes. Eiendomshandel Handelsforetak Notering av proprietære handelsfirmaer Akuna Capital Akuna Capital er et raskt voksende boutiquehandelhus som spesialiserer seg på derivatmarkedsføring og arbitrage. (Chicago) Aldersgate Trading Aldersgate Trading Ltd er et proprietært handelsfirma som spesialiserer seg på tilrettelegging, utvikling og styring av finansielle derivathandlere. (London) Allston Trading Allston Trading, LLC, er en fremste markedsfører i verdensomspennende finansielle utvekslinger. Vi handler hundrevis av forskjellige aksjer, obligasjoner, futures, opsjoner og andre finansielle instrumenter i over 30 utvekslinger. (Chicago) Altrion Trading Group Altrion Trading ble grunnlagt av profesjonelle handelsfolk for å fylle et seriøst tomrum i markedet for å gi håperne tradere den trening og mentorskap de trengte for å lykkes, samt teknologien, lave avgifter og kapital for å holde fagfolk på toppen av spillet sitt. (San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York) Amplify Trading Amplify Trading er et proprietært handelsselskap som spesialiserer seg på utvikling av nye handels talent som gir direkte erfaring i finansmarkeder. (London, Madrid, Paris, Frankfurt, Brisbane) Archelon Group Archelon LLC er en opsjonsmarkedsfører og proprietær handelsmann av børsnoterte opsjoner, futures og aksjer i USA, Europa og Korea. (Chicago, Frankfurt) Assent Assent er et nasjonalt aksjehandelsfirma som for tiden betjener hundrevis av handelsmenn over hele landet. Avatar Securities Avatar Securities, LLC er et proprietært handelsfirma som tilbyr handelstjenester for individuelle handelsmenn og store handelsgrupper. Avatar spesialiserer seg på direkte markedsadgang, systematisk og algoritmisk handel i aksjer og børsnoterte opsjoner med robust handelsgulv i Manhattan, Chicago og en nærvær landsomfattende. (New York, Chicago). (New York, Chicago) Blue Point Trading Blue Point Trading er et unikt boutique-handelsfirma som gir over gjennomsnittet handelsavkastning for sine investorer gjennom sitt forvaltede fond. (Toulon, Frankrike) Bluefin Trading Bluefin Holdings, LLC er et proprietært handelsfirma med fokus på markedsfremstilling i børsnoterte derivater. (New York, London, Chicago, Hong Kong) Blueprint Capital Blueprint Capital er et proprietært handelsfirma som spesialiserer seg på utvikling av nye handels talent og tilrettelegging av erfarne forhandlere. Vi er en ledende innovatør innen elektronisk og algoritmisk handel. (London) Belvedere Trading Belvedere Trading er et proprietært handelsfirma som spesialiserer seg på aksjeindeksalternativer. (Chicago) Blue Capital Group Blue Capital Group er et privateide futures og opsjonshandelsfirma basert i Deerfield, Illinois. (Chicago, Chapel Hill) Breakwater Trading Breakwater er en fleksibel, fokusert, proaktiv organisasjon som forsøker å integrere teknologi med intelligens og markedsvisjon. (Chicago) Bright Trading Bright Trading, LLC er et profesjonelt, proprietært aksjehandelsfirma. Vi har hundrevis av uavhengige handelsmenn som handler fra dusinvis av steder over hele USA. I tillegg nyter våre 8220Bright-At-Home8221-forhandlere fordelene med proprietær handel fra hjemmets komfort. (Las Vegas) Broad Street Trading Broad Street Securities Group (tidligere Broad Street Trading) er et multi-strategi proprietær handelsfirma som tilbyr toppmoderne teknologi og tilgang til fast kapital. Vi er en registrert meglerforhandler, medlem CBSX. (New York) Capital Traders Group Capital Traders Group er et proprietært dag handelsfirma som gir medlemmene tilgang til fast kapital, proprietær trading programvare, ekstern forsterker på stedet trening og live virtuelle handel kontor for eksterne medlemmer. Capstone Trades, aksjer, råvarer, renter og pengemarkeder rundt om i verden. (London, New York, Chicago) Chicago Trading Company Chicago Trading Company (CTC) er et proprietær markedstakerfirma og anerkjent internasjonalt som en ledende leverandør av priser og likviditet på alle amerikanske derivatutvekslinger. (Chicago, New York, London) Chicago-WTS Chicago-WTS er en proprietær handelsgruppe basert i Chicago, en divisjon av WTS Proprietary Trading Group LLC. WTS er medlem av CBSX og er SEC registrert. Chopper Trading Drevet av banebrytende teknologi og forskning, identifiserer Chopper Trading LLC8217s tverrfaglige team av handelsmenn og analytikere raskt og kapitaliserer på nye muligheter. (Chicago, London, New York, Washington DC) Cube Capital Management Corp. Chicago-basert proprietær handelsfirma. Diskret System Proprietært handelsselskap basert i Quebec, Canada. Våre handelsmenn handler fast8217s kapital på flere amerikanske aksjemarkeder: NYSE, NASDAQ og AMEX. DRW Trading Group DRW Trading Group er en aggressiv, dedikert organisasjon engasjert i mange forskjellige aspekter av handelsbransjen, inkludert markedsfremstilling og proprietær handel. Kontorer i Chicago, New York og London. Dubai Professional Trading Group DPTG ble etablert i 2007 som den første profesjonelle handelsgulvet i Midtøsten, og det fortsetter å være leder av bransjen i regionen. DV Trading DV Trading er et proprietært handelsfirma som utfører på alle større nordamerikanske og europeiske futures utvekslinger i en rekke aktivaklasser. EchoTrade ECHOtrade er et profesjonelt handelsfirma dedikert til behovene til den seriøse, off-floor handelsmannen. Eagle 7 Trading Eagle 7 Trading er et privateid, proprietær handelsfirma som ligger i Chicago Board of Trade i Chicago sentrum. Eldorado Trading 8211 Eldorado Trading, LLC, er et proprietært handelsfirma som kapitaliserer på globale rentemarkeder CME Eurodollars, CBOT Treasuries, LIFFE Euriborby er den ledende innovatøren av den elektroniske handelsverdenen. Grunnleggerne av Eldorado har handlet elektronisk siden etableringen av skjermhandelen i begynnelsen av 1990-tallet, noe som gir selskapet en fordel da transaksjoner migrerer fra åpent utbrudd i handelsbrønnen til elektronisk handel på skjermen. (Chicago) Epoch Trading Group Epok er et fullt automatisert, systematisk handelsfirma med 50 ansatte og ble grunnlagt i 2008. Vårt hovedkontor ligger i Sydney, Australia. EUROPROP Trading En leder i å forenkle, trene og støtte handelsfolk på globale elektroniske markeder. Firmaet er basert i Madrid, Spania og en del av Alhambra Capital. EUROPROP tilbyr DMA og lave clearingrenter til globale aksjer og futures. Flow Traders En ledende global teknologiaktivert likviditetsleverandør spesialisert på Exchange Traded Products (ETPs). Frontline Capital Frontline Capital er et proprietært handelsfirma som spesialiserer seg på aksjer, futuresprodukter og valutaer på alle nordamerikanske og europeiske børser. (Toronto) Fusionary Trading Fusionary bruker en syntese av visdom av tidene og tidstestede verktøy for å hjelpe deg med å tjene mer penger på kortere tid. Futex Trading 8211 Futex ble satt opp av handelsmenn som hadde vært åpenhandel på LIFFE-gulvet siden 1990. I 1998 da LIFFE-etasjen var å migrere på dataskjermer, var Futex-handelsmenn en av de første til å etablere en profesjonell datamaskinbasert handelsgulv. (London, Woking, Singapore, Chicago) Gambit Trading Gambit Trading, LLC er en proprietær handelsgruppe for tiden lokalisert i Rolling Meadows, IL. GETCO 8211 GETCO er et privatforetatt, elektronisk handelsfirma dedikert til å øke likviditeten og effektiviteten i verdens finansmarkeder. (Chicago, London, New York, Singapore) Gelber Group 8211 Gelber er en unik tjenesteleverandør for den enkelte profesjonelle næringsdrivende, profesjonell handelsgruppe eller institusjon. Vi har et ubøyelig fokus på teknologiledelse og service, da vi søker å utvide vår tilgang til flytende elektroniske markeder rundt om i verden. Gelber Group opprettholder filosofien om at tydelig kommunikasjon og samhandling gir vellykkede handelsresultater. (Chicago, Cranford NJ, Greenwich CT, San Diego, London, Schindellegi Sveits) Genesis Securities 8211 Genesis gir en fullt tilpassbar, toppmoderne DMA-plattform Laser for den sofistikerte handelsmannen. Geneva Trading 8211 Geneva Trading er et proprietært elektronisk handelsfirma som ligger i Chicago, Illinois USA og Dublin, Irland. Fokus er på elektronisk omsatte futures og aksjemarkeder i USA og Europa. (Chicago, Dublin) GGT Trading Proprietary Equity Options Handelsfirma. (Chicago) GHF Group GHF Group driver sin sterke vekst ved å bygge sterke lokale relasjoner, rekruttere det lyseste talentet, og identifisere og fange muligheter foran markedet. Grace Hall Trading Grace Hall Trading er et proprietært handelsfirma som spesialiserer seg på transaksjonsarbitrage, volatilitetsarbitrage og hendelsesdrevet handel. Basert i Chicago og etablert i 2008, benytter firmaet banebrytende teknologi som handler futures, aksjer og aksjeopsjoner. Great Point Capital Great Point Capital er et FINRA-registrert handelsfirma med hovedkontor i Chicago. Group One Trading 8211 Group One er et av de største proprietære opsjonshandelsfirmaene i landet. (New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, San Francisco) Hard Eight Trading Hard Åtte Futures, LLC og Hard Eight Trading, LLC er proprietære handelsselskaper med hovedkontor i Chicago, Illinois. (Chicago) Heron Futures Heron Futures er et ledende uavhengig handelsfirma som støtter handelsmarkedet i futures markedet. (London) HTG Capital Partners HTG-oppdraget er å muliggjøre suksess for sine forhandlere. (Chicago, New York) Hold Brothers 8211 Proprietary Online Stock Trading. IMC Financial Markets 8211 IMC Group er en global finansiell organisasjon med tilstedeværelse i Amsterdam, London, New York, Chicago, Hong Kong, Sydney og Zug. Infinium Capital Management 8211 Infinium Capital Management er et proprietær kapitalforvaltningsfirma med kontorer i Chicago og New York. Grunnlagt i Chicago i 2001 ble vårt firma bygd av et kjerneteam med tiår med erfaring innen handel, programvareutvikling og finansiell modellering. Grunnleggerne deler gründerfortid, etter å ha bygget og solgt en rekke selskaper og teknologier både inn og ut av finansmarkedene. Integra Capital Integra Capital er et New York-basert proprietær handelsfirma og en divisjon av T3 Trading Group. Integra er hjemsted for interne og eksterne handelsfolk rundt om i landet. De gir kapitalutnyttelse, profesjonelle handelsplattformer og eksepsjonell concierge service amp støtte til aktive aksjer, opsjoner og forex handelsmenn. Intelligent Market Trading Company 8211 Den Intelligent Market Trading Company er et Chicago-basert proprietær handelsselskap med hovedfokus for å anvende cutting edge teknologi og trading teknikker til problemet med gulvhandlede og elektronisk omsatte derivater. International Trading Group DE Trading Corporation 8211 Privateforetakshandel med handelsvirksomhet i de nordlige forstedene i Chicago. Jane Street Capital 8211 Jane Street er et kvantitativt proprietært handelsfirma som bringer en dyp forståelse av markeder, en vitenskapelig tilnærming og nyskapende teknologi sammen for å handle lønnsomt i finansmarkeder. Jane Street doesn8217t søker utenfor investeringer og har ikke kunder. Jane Street ble grunnlagt i 2000 og er 190 engasjerte mennesker i New York, Chicago, London og Tokyo. Jump Trading 8211 Jump Trading, LLC er et proprietært handelsselskap, fokusert på handelsindeks futures, opsjoner og aksjer. Fordi vi ikke er et meglerfirma, har vi ikke kunder. Inntekter kommer utelukkende fra trading Jump8217s proprietære konto. Jump Trading er medlem av Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) og American Stock Exchange (AMEX). Jump er også et ikke-clearingmedlem i European Exchange (Eurex). (Chicago, London, Singapore) Kershner Trading Group 8211 Siden 1993 har Kershner Trading blitt bygget på ideen om felles suksess. Vi er en klassisk proprietær handelsvirksomhet som tilbyr full service, støtte og kapital til våre forhandlere, inkludert toppmoderne, teknologiprogrammer med direkte tilgang til amerikanske markeder. Våre forhandlere handler for tiden i vårt Austin, Tx kontor, men vi er alltid interessert i å høre fra grupper av vellykkede handelsfolk på andre steder. Medlem NASD, SEC registrert. Ketchum Trading Ketchum Trading, LLC er et privateid, proprietær handelsfirma med hovedkvarter i Chicago, Illinois. Kingstree Trading 8211 Chicago prop trading firma som på en gang angivelig gjorde en tredjedel av volumet i e-mini SampP. (Chicago) Lake Street Trading Lake Street Trading (LST) er et proprietært handelsfirma med hovedkvarter i Chicago, Illinois. League Traders Limited Uavhengig backing London basert finansielle futures handelsmenn. Fokuserer på de viktigste finansielle futures-markedene på LIFFE, EUREX og CME. L. E.S. Handelshandlere handler gjennom et CBOE-børs (CBSX) medlem og SEC-registrert meglerforhandler. Egenkapitalhandlere, kvantitative forhandlere, svarte bokser, grå boksapplikasjoner og fjernhandlere er alle velkommen. London Global Invetsments London Global Investments Ltd er et proprietært handelsselskap som spesialiserer seg på opplæring og ledelse av proprietære handelsforhandlere. Mako Group Mako Group er et globalt diversifisert finansielt selskap som omfatter salgs-, handels - og investeringsstyring. Man Over Market Ledet av Lewis Borsellino er Man Over Market et nytt program utviklet for unge fagfolk som er ivrige etter å komme inn i investeringsspillet. Marex Trading 8211 MAREX Financial er en uavhengig meglerforhandler som tilbyr verdensomspennende dekning av råvarer, finansielle futures og opsjoner og valutamarkeder. Marquette Partners 8211 Marquette Partners er en ledende likviditetsleverandør til world8217s største derivatutveksling. Som en tidlig pioner innen elektronisk futures trading har Marquette utviklet enkeltpersoner til å handle på utvekslinger over hele verden, inkludert Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Chicago Board of Trade, Eurex, Euronext-Paris, Euronext-LIFFE og Borsa Italia. (Chicago) Mercury Financial Futures Et algoritmisk handelsfirma, basert i hjertet av City of London. MET Traders Et ledende finansielt futures tradinghus som spesialiserer seg på proprietær handel som gir tilgang til verdens fremste derivatutvekslinger, inkludert Euronext. LIFFE, CME, CBOT, Eurex og ICE Futures. (London) MGB Trading MGB Trading er et privateide proprietær handelsfirma basert i Montreal, Canada. Traders på MGB, handler firmaets hovedstad på NASDAQ, NYSE AMEX AMEX-markedet. Nico Trading 8211 Nico Holdings LLC er et proprietært handelsfirma. Vi lager markeder og tar posisjoner 24 timer i døgnet. Vi er aktive i børshandlede og over-the-counter-markeder, inkludert spot - og derivatkontrakter. Oak Futures Ligger i Financial Capital of Europe, er Oak Futures City of London-kontoret ideelt plassert for å dra nytte av det hardt arbeidende, profesjonelle og livlige miljøet som er skapt av likesinnede mennesker. (London) Optiver 8211 Optiver er et internasjonalt proprietært handelshus som hovedsakelig handler om derivater, aksjer og obligasjoner. Firmaet har utvidet seg fra noen få Amsterdam-baserte markedsførere til en global arbitrage-gruppe med datterselskaper i Chicago og Sydney. Patak Trading Partners Patak Trading Partners er en handelshandelskonsernhandel med handel i Chicago. Peak6 Trading 8211 Et av de største aksjeopsjonsmarkedsvirksomhetene i USA (Chicago, San Francisco, Seattle, New York) Philadelphia Proprietary Trading Group Et boutiquefirma som er parret med WTS Proprietary Tradings globale ressurser, den ledende likviditetsleverandøren på CBSX. Positive Equity Limited Positive Equity ble grunnlagt i 2008 og fokuserer på disiplin, hardt arbeid og innovasjon i strategier og produkter for suksess. Vi handler futures og aksjer. Vi ansetter både erfarne handelsmenn og trainees som er forberedt på å jobbe hardt for langsiktig suksess. Prime International Trading Våre forhandlere passer ikke til noen ekte mugg. Noen er veldig store og mange flere er nisjehandlere. De konsentrerer seg om markedsfremstilling og arbitrasjemuligheter med gode risikoprisutbetalinger. Pulsar Capital Pulsar Capital er et internasjonalt proprietært handelsfirma som opererer globalt på et bredt spekter av aktivaklasser (aksjer, valutaer, rentesatser, metaller, energi, husdyr, sopp og jordbruk). Reverb Capital 8211 Reverb Capital gjør seg hørt fra epicentret i Chicagos Financial District. Fokusert på høyfrekvent handel i aksjer, futures og opsjonsmarkeder, er Reverb et proprietært handelsfirma som slår til en annen tromme. Ronin Capital 8211 Proprietær handelsvirksomhet som dekker en rekke markeder, inkludert aksjer, statsobligasjoner, bedriftsobligasjoner og tilknyttede derivater på globale børser og elektronisk. Savius, LLC Savius, LLC er et handelsbeskyttet handelsfirma med hovedkontor i Chicago og forhandlere i USA og Europa. SKTY Trading 8211 SKTY Trading ble grunnlagt i 2002 som et marked som gjør firmaet i EuroDollar opsjoner på Chicago Mercantile Exchange. SKTY har siden etableringen utvidet sitt fokus for å inkludere flere produkter på flere børser. SMB Capital 8211 SMB Capital, LLC er et privateide investeringspartnerskap engasjert i daghandel NYSE og NASDAQ aksjer. Schneider Group Schneider Group er en ledende global leverandør av serviceforhandlere og meglere over hele verden med den raskeste tilkoblingen, den nyeste handelsteknologien og ekspert IT - og risikostyring. Schonfeld Group Schonfeld Securities, LLC pionerer kortfristet handelsbransjen da den begynte i drift i 1988. Det er et av de største amerikanske proprietære aksjehandelsfirmaene når det gjelder antall handelsmenn og volumhandel på NYSE og NASDAQ. SFG Trading Services Et globalt handelsservicefirma som tilbyr kvantitative og automatiserte tilpassede løsninger til erfarne. høyvolumhandlere og profesjonelle handelsgrupper rundt om i verden som spesialiserer seg på amerikanske, europeiske aksjer og futures-markeder. Simplex Investments 8211 Chicago-baserte eiendomsforetak på gulvet fokusert på den aktive næringsdrivende. Spot Trading Spot Trading er et off-floor trading firma som spesialiserer seg på aksjeopsjoner. (Chicago) Starmark Prop Trading Starmark er et proprietært handelsselskap dedikert til å gi finansielle handelsmenn tilgang til globale markeder til konkurransedyktige priser, med den beste teknologien som er tilgjengelig. Sun Trading Sun Trading er et privateid, proprietært firma dedikert til algoritmisk handel med ulike aktivaklasser i verdens finansmarkeder. Susquehanna International Group (SIG) Susquehanna International Group er et globalt kvantitativt handelsfirma som har bygget nesten all sin egen trading teknologi fra bunnen av. SIGs handelsfolk konkurrerer på finansmarkedene ved å utnytte sine kvantitative ferdigheter til å ta beregnede risikoer med SIGs proprietær kapital. De har et best-in-class handelsutviklingsprogram. Bedriftenes suksess ligger i krysset mellom handel, kvantitativ og teknologi. System 2 Trading System 2 Trading ble grunnlagt for handelsmenn av handelsfolk. Vi visste hva vi ønsket: lavpris opsjonshandel, proprietær teknologi og en avslappet samarbeidshandel. Men vi kunne ikke finne den. Så vi bygget det selv. Tibra Capital Et globalt stiftfirma som spesialiserer seg på markedsarbeid og arbitrage. (Chicago, London, Amsterdam, Hong Kong, Sydney, Wollongong) Tittel Trading 8211 Tittel Trading er privateide proprietære handelsfirma. Tittelhandlere handler fast8217s kapital på flere amerikanske aksjemarkeder: NYSE, NASDAQ og AMEX. (Ville St-Laurent. QC) TopstepTrader TopstepTrader inviterer deg til å oppleve kraften i vår trading kombinere. Vi støtter økonomisk konsistente, lønnsomme og disiplinerte futureshandlere. Toro Trading Toro Trading LLC er et dynamisk derivatmarkedsfirma som spesialiserer seg på aksjeopsjoner, futures og ETFs. Toro er medlem av Chicago Board Options Exchange, Philadelphia Stock Exchange, NYSE Euronext og New York Biotech Association. (New York) Torus Capital Torus Capital er et proprietært handelsfirma som spesialiserer seg på opsjoner og futures over et bredt spekter av utvekslinger og produkter. (Chicago, Greenwich, New York) Tower Hill Trading Tower Hill Trading er et ledende proprietært handelsselskap basert i sentrum av Chicago. Vi tilbyr et overordnet arbeidsmiljø, muligheten til å lære av den beste, toppmoderne teknologien, ekstremt konkurransedyktige utbetalinger og tilgang til betydelig handelskapital. (Chicago) Trade Vision Capital Trade Vision Capital tilbyr sine kunder den høyeste endelige bestillingsprogramvaren som er tilgjengelig. Det er den eneste programvaren for å motta NASD8217s platina-sertifisering. Tradebot Systems Tradebot Systems gir likviditet til aksjemarkedet. (Kansas City, MO) Traditum Group Traditum er et diversifisert proprietært handelsfirma som spesialiserer seg på markedsarbeid, verdsettelsesarbitrage og fundamentalt orienterte handelsstrategier på tvers av en rekke innenlandske og internasjonale markeder. Transmarket Group TransMarket Group LLC er et globalt privat handels - og investeringsselskap. Gi risikokapital og markedsadgang til enkeltpersoner med det formål å handle de globale finansmarkedene. Ansatte handler alle globale børsnoterte derivater, aksjer, råvarer og utvalgte kontantmarkeder. (London, Madrid, Mumbai, New York, Singapore, Sydney) Trillium Trading Trillium Trading L. L.C. er en fremste proprietær handelsfirma som utmerker seg på kort sikt egenkapitalhandel, og porteføljestyring. (New York, Edison NJ, Princeton NJ, Miami FL) Twitch LLC Twitch LLC er et proprietært handelsselskap med hovedkontor i Chicago Board of Trade-bygningen. Vankar Trading 8211 Profesjonell styring av handelssystemer. Divisjoner i Nord-Amerika, Europa og Australia. Vortex Capital Group Vortex Capital Group Ltd (VCG) er et proprietært handelsfirma med fokus på ulike handelsstrategier på tvers av flere markeder og aktivaklasser. (Toronto) WH Trading WH Trading LLC er en proprietær futures, opsjoner og aksjer trading firma med hovedkontor i Chicago, IL. WH Trading, som ble grunnlagt i 1994, fungerer i dag som en primær likviditetsleverandør på gulvet i de store futuresutvekslingene i Chicago, og også som en børs som utpekt Lead Market Maker for elektronisk omsatte produkter i en rekke aktivaklasser. (Chicago, London) Wasserman Capital På Wasserman Capital er vår lidenskap handel og trening andre hvordan å handle. Wasserman Capital har et bevist lærlingprogram som utnytter de samme historisk anerkjente metodene som vellykkede handelsmenn har brukt i over 100 år. Vårt treningsprogram gir handelskompetanse og hands-on coaching som er nødvendig for å bidra til å gjøre din lidenskap for finansmarkedet til din karriere. (Miami Beach, FL) Wolverine Trading Wolverine har hovedkontor i Chicago og har kontorer i New York, San Francisco, Philadelphia og London. World Trade Securities WTS Proprietary Trading Group LLC, er et privateide proprietær handelsselskap basert i NYC, New York og et medlem av CBSX og er SEC registrert. (New York) Xerxes Trading Xerxes Trading representerer Morristown, NJ Office of Hold Brothers Online Investment Services, LLC (medlem FINRA-SIPC). Se jobboppføringer, diskusjoner og nyheter i vår LinkedIn-gruppe Abonner og Koble Abonner på vårt nyhetsbrev Et perspektiv på regionale og globale strategier for multinasjonale bedrifter. Sit på denne artikkelen som: Rugman, A. Verbeke, A. J Int Bus Stud (2004) 35: 3.no: 10.1057palgrave. jibs.8400073 Multinasjonale foretak (MNE) er de viktigste drivkraften til globalisering, da de fremmer økt økonomisk gjensidig avhengighet mellom nasjonale markeder. Den ultimate testen for å vurdere om disse MNEene er globale, er deres faktiske inntrengningsnivå på markeder over hele verden, spesielt i de brede triadmarkedene i NAFTA, EU og Asia. Likevel avslører data om aktivitetene til de 500 største MNE at svært få er vellykkede globalt. For 320 av de 380 firmaene som geografiske salgsdata er tilgjengelige for, er gjennomsnittlig 80,3 av totalt salg i deres hjemområde i triaden. Dette betyr at mange av verdens største bedrifter ikke er globale, men regionalt baserte, når det gjelder bredde og dybde av markedsdekning. Globalisering, i form av en balansert geografisk distribusjon av salg over triaden, gjenspeiler derfor et spesielt og ganske uvanlig utfall av å gjøre internasjonal virksomhet (IB). Den regionale konsentrasjonen av salget har viktige implikasjoner for ulike trender av vanlig IB-forskning, samt for den bredere ledelsesmessige debatten om utforming av optimale strategier og styringsstrukturer for MNE. fastspesifikke fordeler global strategi lokalisering regional strategi semi-globalisering triad verdikjede Introduksjon Globalisering, i retning av økt økonomisk gjensidig avstand mellom nasjoner, er et dårlig forstått fenomen. I dette papiret fokuserer vi på sentrale aktører i globaliseringsprosessen, nemlig de firmaene som driver denne prosessen. Et relativt lite sett med multinasjonale bedrifter (MNE) står for de fleste av verdens handel og investeringer. Faktisk står de største 500 MNEene for over 90 av verdens bestander av utenlandske direkte investeringer (FDI) og de selv utfører omtrent halvparten av verdens handel (Rugman, 2000). Likevel viser dette dokumentet at de fleste av disse firmaene ikke er globale selskaper, i den forstand at de har en bred og dyp penetrasjon av utenlandske markeder over hele verden. I stedet har de fleste av dem størstedelen av salget i triadets hjemben, nemlig i Nord-Amerika, EU eller Asia. Denne nye syn på globalisering er svært forskjellig fra det konvensjonelle, vanlige perspektivet. Det sistnevnte perspektivet fokuserer hovedsakelig på makro-nivå vekstmønstre i handel og FDI, og sammenligner disse dataene med nasjonale BNP-vekstratene, men uten noen gang å analysere tilsvarende mikronivå-vekstdata for MNEene som er ansvarlige for handels - og FDI-strømmene (FN , 2002). Triadkraftkonseptet Det amerikanske økonomiske hegemoni, karakteristisk for epoken etter andre verdenskrig, endte tidlig på 1970-tallet. Lukkingen av gullvinduet og den flytende dollaren i 1971 kan betraktes som en tidlig indikator for den nye verdensorden, med økonomisk kraft mer spredt over triaden i Nord-Amerika, EU og Asia. Utviklingen av verdens bestand av FDI er indikativ for den relative nedgangen i amerikansk økonomisk makt: i 1967 representerte USA fortsatt majoriteten (50,4) av den totale bestanden av utgående FDI i 1990 denne andelen hadde falt til bare en fjerdedel 25.4) (Dunning, 2001). Van Den Bulcke (1995) gir en innsiktsfull redegjørelse for utviklingen mot en triadisk verdensøkonomi. I 1985 publiserte Kenichi Ohmae, på den tiden en ledende McKinsey-konsulent i Japan, sin landemerkestudie Triad Power. uten tvil en av de mest innsiktige, internasjonale styringsbøkene de siste to tiårene. Triaden, i Ohmaes arbeid, var et geografisk rom bestående av USA, EU og Japan. Dette geografiske rommet, ifølge Ohmae, deler en rekke fellesheter: lav makroøkonomisk vekst en lignende teknologisk infrastruktur tilstedeværelsen av store, både kapital - og kunnskapsintensive selskaper i de fleste næringer en relativ homogenisering av etterspørsel (med en konvergens av nødvendig nøkkel produktattributter) og proteksjonistiske trykk. Triaden er hjemsted for de fleste innovasjoner innen industrien, og inkluderer de tre største markedene i verden for de fleste nye produkter. En nyttig indikator for denne kjerne triadene var viktig, er konsentrasjonen av verdens største MNE i USA, EU og Japan, som rapportert i Rugman (2000). I 2000, av verdens største 500 MNE, hadde 430 sitt hovedkontor i disse kjerne triadregionene. I 1996 var det 443, i 1991 var det 410, og tilbake i 1981 var det 445. Problemet som mange av disse MNEene står overfor, er ifølge Ohmae at de selger ingeniørprodukter. det vil si innovative og differensierte produkter, som skyldes høye investeringer i kapitalintensive produksjonsprosesser og kunnskapsutvikling. Dessverre mister disse produktene raskt deres monopolstatus. Til tross for patenter og merkenavn diffunderer teknologien seg raskere til rivaler enn de nødvendige distribusjonsmulighetene kan bygges på utenlandske markeder, noe som gjør det vanskelig å tilbakebetale innovasjonskostnader. The dilemma for any company that has developed a new superproduct with large expected demand throughout the triad is thus as follows: setting up an extensive distribution capability for the product ex ante . throughout the triad, may entail high, irreversible, fixed costs, and therefore high risks, if the superproduct somehow does not deliver on its sales expectations. Conversely, if the superproduct is first marketed at home, rival companies in other legs of the triad are expected to rapidly create an equivalent product, capture their home triad region market, and dominate distribution in that market. In this context, Ohmae introduces the concept of global impasse to describe the problems faced by even the largest companies to repeat their home triad base market share performance in the two other triad markets. Only a limited number of firms, such as Coca-Cola and IBM, have, according to Ohmae, succeeded in becoming a triad power . A triad power is defined as a company that has (1) equal penetration and exploitation capabilities, and (2) no blind spots, in each of the triad regions ( Ohmae, 1985: 165 ). In Ohmaes view the deep penetration into each triad market is critical to the recovery of innovation costs. The absence of blind spots is important in order to avoid surprises: that is, unexpected strategic moves by foreign rivals or home country competitors setting up alliances with foreign firms. A triad power is thus an MNE that has been successful in insiderization. The importance of the absence of blind spots was also emphasized by Hamel and Prahalad (1985). who defined a global company as a firm with distribution systems in key foreign markets that permit cross-subsidization, international retaliation, and world-scale volume. These authors focused especially on the importance of strong, worldwide brand positions and distribution channels, and highlighted the limited value to large firms of mere cost advantages through offshore sourcing and rationalized manufacturing. Given the global impasse challenge described above, Ohmae (1985: Chapter 12) suggests the use of consortia and joint ventures to capture the non-home triad markets. In case the MNE wishes to become a triad power on its own, through wholly owned operations, Ohmae prescribes an Anchorage perspective: that is, a corporate center that is mentally located in Anchorage (Alaska), equidistant from the economic and political power bases in the United States, the EU and Japan. This is in line with Perlmutters (1969) prescription of developing a geocentric mentality in MNEs. In practice, such a firm should operate with regional headquarters in each leg of the triad in order to capitalize on commonalities within each region, at a lower cost and with more market knowledge than if corporate headquarters performed those activities. Finally, Ohmae (1985) contains one last important insight, namely that MNEs from each triad region should identify a fourth region . where it should be easy, relative to the rest of the world, to earn an important market share. This fourth region will depend on the industry and firm involved, but for Japan it would typically include Asian markets, for the United States its neighboring trading partners, and for Europe those countries with which much trade or trade potential exists. However, Ohmae (1985) did not actually anticipate the extension of the core triad to the broad triad of today. The broad triad consists of NAFTA, the expanded EU and Asia. In parallel with the introduction of the Canada US Free Trade Agreement in 1989, NAFTA in 1994 and its expansion to the Free Trade Area of the Americas by 2005, the EU will further expand to 25 countries in 2004 (and perhaps more in the future). In Asia, in November 2002, China agreed to a free trade agreement with the 10 members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), signaling a wide trade and investment agreement for Asia. In September 2003, India and the ASEAN members agreed to forge a free trade area by 2012, while Japan and ASEAN agreed to begin negotiations on far-reaching trade and investment liberalization by 2005. Such institutional arrangements represent the agglomeration of attractive, proximate foreign markets (from a geographical, cultural, economic, and administrative perspective) into a broad triad region. This will facilitate even deeper intra-regional market penetration. In contrast, little progress has been achieved in recent years in the realm of more global integration among nations through multilateral negotiations, especially at the level of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This situation is not expected to improve in the near future (for a discussion, see Rugman and Verbeke (2003) ). At present, a majority of trade is intra-regional, and conducted in each part of the broad triad of NAFTA, the EU and Asia ( Rugman, 2000 ). The present paper tests whether the worlds largest firms have been capable of implementing Kenichi Ohmaes visionary strategy and becoming (broad) triad powers during the two decades after his path-breaking book. Our work has three caveats. First, our paper presents data on the distribution of sales across the broad triad regions. This should be considered as a starting point for introducing systematically a regional component in international business (IB) research. Individual MNEs may be faced with specific environmental requirementsopportunities, as well as internal company ones that suggest a different regional delineation, consistent with Ghemawats (2001) framework on the distance between countries. In a similar vein, the subnational level (i. e. regions within a single country) may also be important in the IB context, both for manufacturing location decisions and for the targeting of specific subnational areas for sales and distribution. Second, a balanced distribution of sales across the triad, although likely beneficial to an MNEs sustained performance, is not necessarily critical to all MNEs. For example, firms may attempt to establish a dominant position in their home market, and may have little interest in pursuing a balanced, triad-based distribution of sales. Third, different activities in the value chain may be associated with varying levels of globalization. In this paper we focus primarily on sales, simply because these constitute the ultimate reflection of market success, but we also discuss the issue of downstream vs upstream globalization. Empirical evidence of triad power The 500 largest companies in the world accounted for over 14 trillion of total sales (revenues) in fiscal year 2001. The average revenues for a firm in the top 500 were 28 billion, ranging from Wal-Mart at 220 billion to Takenaka at 10 billion. In this study of the intra-regional sales of these 500 firms, a total of 380 were included with available geographic segment data. These 380 firms account for 79.2 of the total revenues of all the 500 firms. The average sales volume of a firm in the set of 380 is 29.2 billion. Across these 380 large firms the average intra-regional sales represent 71.9. A relative sales dominance in a specific regional market, rather than a very wide and evenly distributed spread of sales, reflects five underlying issues critical to the MNEs functioning. First, if most MNEs sales are unevenly distributed across the globe, and usually concentrated in just one geographic market, this means that the firms products are not really equally accessible andor attractive to consumers all around the world, in spite of many MNEs attempting to adapt their products to local demand. Second, the lack of global market success, although based on aggregate company-level data, could be interpreted as a reflection of the limits to the non-location-bound nature of the MNEs knowledge base that is, their firm-specific advantages (FSAs). Firms may have sophisticated and proprietary technological knowledge, brand names, etc. but there may be severe limits to the joint international transferability of this knowledge, and its acceptance by customers across regions. These limits may exist irrespective of whether the knowledge is embodied in final products and then exported, transferred as an intermediate product through licensing, or utilized in foreign affiliates through FDI. It should be recognized that some examples exist of rapid cross-border integration of sales, as exemplified by the success of Airbus aircraft in the United States, Japanese cars in Europe, and a variety of American consumer goods in Japan and China, but the magnitude of this trend, as compared with overall sales volumes, remains small across the 500 largest companies. Third, the observed lack of market performance across regions may also point to a relative inability to access and deploy the required location-bound FSAs, which would lead to benefits of regional and national responsiveness. Fourth, if the MNEs market position is very different in the various regions of the world this indicates the need for very different competitive strategies: a leadership role in one market may require different patterns of decisions and actions than the role of a (perhaps ambitious) junior player in another market. These differential roles should then be reflected in the deployment of specific combinations of non-location-bound and location-bound FSAs in each region. Unfortunately, in spite of much think global, act local rhetoric in both the academic and popular business press, there appears to be little empirical evidence that this approach has permitted host region market penetration levels similar to those obtained in the home region. Fifth, the four elements above have important implications for MNE governance. It might be incorrect to attribute the present relative lack of overseas market success of many firms to an inappropriate governance structure. The presence of multiple environmental circumstances may also be critical here (powerful foreign rivals in other triad regions government shelter of domestic industries buyer preferences for local products cultural and administrative differences as compared to the home region etc.). However, the need for regional strategies does suggest the parallel introduction of a regional component in the MNEs governance structure to deal appropriately with the distinctive characteristics of each leg of the triad, and with the regions outside it, much in line with Ohmaes (1985) prescriptions. This perspective is developed further in the later sections of the paper. This need for distinct regional strategies should be viewed as a complement to the well-known normative models that advocate simple globalization strategies as a set of purposive decisions and actions instrumental to a broad and deep penetration of foreign markets ( Govindarajan and Gupta, 2001 Jeannet, 2000 Yip, 2002 ). Regionalization should be viewed as an expression of semi-globalization ( Ghemawat, 2003 ). Semi-globalization implies that we observe neither extreme geographical fragmentation of the world in national markets nor complete integration. Incomplete integration means that location specificity, in this case regional specificity, matters. Only in the context of incomplete integration is there scope for international MNE strategy that is conceptually distinct from conventional domestic strategy. Empirical evidence and meaning of regional strategies The majority of the worlds largest 500 companies (the Fortune 500 ) are MNEs: that is, they produce andor distribute products andor services across national borders. Yet, very few MNEs have the ability to sell standardized products and services around the world, a type of globalization originally advocated by Levitt (1983). In the mainstream IB literature it is now widely recognized that benefits of integration resulting from global-scale economies can be reaped only if accompanied by strategies of national responsiveness, guided by both external pressures for local adaptation and internal pressures for requisite variation. What is unfortunately often neglected is that, irrespective of MNEs efforts to augment their alleged non-location-bound FSAs with a location-bound component, no balanced geographical dispersion of sales is achieved in most cases. For 365 of the 380 firms included in our study, data were available that permitted a further decomposition of their foreign sales. It should be noted that many of the remaining 135 Fortune 500 companies are actually operating solely in their home region, with no sales elsewhere, and for others there are insufficient data. Of the 365 with data, only nine MNEs are unambiguously global, with at least 20 of their sales in all three regions of the triad, but less than 50 in any one region. This picture of regionalization, rather than globalization, is shown in Table 1 . Classification of the top 500 MNEs The definitions adopted in Table 1 are as follows: Home region oriented . In all, 320 firms have at least 50 of their sales in their home region of the triad. The threshold of 50 was chosen as we assume that a region representing more than 50 of total sales will systematically both shape and constrain most important decisions and actions taken by the MNE. It also implies a concentration of the MNEs downstream FSAs in that region, as explained in the next section. Bi-regional . In all, 25 MNEs are bi-regional, defined as firms with at least 20 of their sales in each of two regions, but less than 50 in any one region. This set includes 25 firms with sales ranging between 20 and 50 in the home region and 20 or over in a second region. The threshold of 20 was chosen because we assume that having two regional markets, each representing at least one fifth of a large firms sales, reflects impressive market success resulting from extensive downstream FSAs in those two markets. Host region oriented . In all, 11 firms have more than 50 of their sales in a triad market other than their home region. Global . Only nine of the MNEs included are global, defined as having sales of 20 or more in each of the three parts of the triad, but less than 50 in any one region of the triad. The 20 figure is less than the one-third required for an equal triad distribution, and so is biased downwards in favor of finding global MNEs. Conceptually, it implies the successful deployment of downstream FSAs in three distinct markets. The North American and European region of the broad triad are of approximate equal size, as measured by GDP. Asia is smaller than either as measured by GDP, but is nearly equal when taking into account purchasing power parity (PPP). Weighing the three legs of the broad triad by GDP, and even correcting for PPP, will not generate a larger number of global firms. Within each of the groups above, the home triad region sales weighted averages are as follows: home region oriented (320 firms): 80.3 A small set of firms are near miss global MNEs, as they approximate the percentages required to be considered global. One subset includes ExxonMobil, Royal DutchShell and Nestl, which are probably global in terms of geographic spread of their sales, but cannot be so classified due to absent data. Several firms, such as Aventis, are bi-regional and probably would be classified as global if the missing data for Asia were available. Four other MNEs, namely McDonalds, Eastman Kodak, Anglo-American, and 3M, just miss the global firm status. For example, McDonalds has only 14.8 of sales in Asia, Eastman Kodak has only 17.2, Anglo American has 17.8, and 3M has 18.9. Some special cases The two MNEs conventionally regarded as global, indeed as primary agents of globalization, are Coca-Cola and McDonalds. Yet, only Coca-Cola is truly a global MNE. Ranking as 129th in the Fortune 500 list, it has over 20 of its sales across all three parts of the triad: 38.4 in North America, 22.4 in Europe, and 24.9 in Asia. Of Coca-Colas sales in Asia, 74 are in Japan, but the company is attempting to increase its market in China. In contrast, McDonalds, ranked as 340th in the Fortune 500 list, is a bi-regional MNE. It has 36.6 of its sales in North America, 37.1 in Europe, but only 13.8 in Asia. Nike is another interesting case. It is not one of the largest 500 firms, as its sales are under 10 billion. It sources 99 of its products offshore, primarily in China (38) and South East Asia (61), and much of its apparel (86) is produced outside the United States. Yet, Nike is a company with the majority of its sales in the Americas (58.2). Indeed, it has 52.1 of sales in its home market of the United States. Nike also competes in Europe with 29 of its sales there, but not much in Asia with only 12.9 of sales there. In terms of employment, of the 22,000 Nike employees, over half are located in the United States (54.7). If we include other countries in the Americas, this number rises to 60.2. Europe, the Middle East and Africa account for another 24.9. Asia and the Pacific account for about 14.9 (or 3000 employees), but this region is also home to about 660,000 employees of independent contract companies that supply Nike products. These independent contractors are not owned by Nike, but are part of its supply network. Nike is only indirectly responsible for the working conditions of the employees working for these independent firms. Yet, owing to the adverse perceived impact on its brand image of sweatshop conditions in these factories, Nike is now assuming some responsibility for the labor conditions in the factories of its independent suppliers. The Nike case indicates the importance of understanding the precise FSAs of an MNE. Nike is not successful because it outsources most of its production in Asia. Instead, it outperforms other competitors because of its business model, in which its brand name is the dominant FSA. This brand name signifies high-quality, stylish, cool sports shoes and sports apparel. All its competitors also outsource in South East Asia significant portions of production. This access to cheap labor represents a country factor condition, not an FSA by itself. In a similar vein, Wal-Mart outperforms other firms owing to its unique business model, not primarily by outsourcing to China. These firms outsourcing strategies reflect internalization arbitrage more specifically the ability to link attractive (but generally available), host country production factors, used at the upstream end of the value chain with upstream FSAs. However, only in the presence of downstream FSAs (especially branding) do such strategies lead to market success, and this is often restricted to the home triad region. The Nike and Wal-Mart cases illustrate the crucial importance of the sales data used in this paper to assess market success. Implications for emerging research themes In this section, some of the implications of the lack of empirical evidence for globalization are considered across the field of IB research. Five research areas of particular relevance are selected. The first two areas deal with the foundations of MNE competitive advantage, namely FSAs and location advantages, respectively. The next three areas are related to MNE strategy, structure and performance. Implications for the relevance of the internalization and internationalization models of international expansion The internalization model of foreign expansion ( Buckley and Casson, 1976 Rugman, 1981 ), and especially its eclectic paradigm version, has been the dominant conceptual model in IB research during the past two decades. It suggests that firms will establish foreign affiliates in the case of strong ownership advantages, location advantages, and internalization advantages ( Dunning, 1981 ). The model assumes that MNEs systematically engage in a costbenefit calculus of all possible entry modes, namely exports, licensing, and FDI (including, more recently, hybrid modes). Here, FDI may be the preferred mode from the outset if government-imposed and natural market imperfections make exports and licensing impossible or comparatively more expensive, and if the firm has already been operating abroad ( Buckley and Casson, 1981 ). In contrast, the internationalization model of the Scandinavian school argues that firms will incrementally build foreign operations, starting with low resource commitments in culturally proximate countries, and then expanding these commitments and geographic scope. Here experiential learning is critical, and path dependencies can be observed in the growth of the MNEs experiential knowledge base, especially as regards knowledge of the markets involved ( Barkema et al. 1996 Johansson and Vahlne, 1977. 1990 ). Little integration has occurred between the two schools, which have largely flourished on their own without much cross-fertilization, and each has a loyal following of researchers. The internalization school focuses at the outset on market imperfections involving businessusage specificity . whereas the internationalization school starts from imperfections arising from location specificity . in the spirit of Ghemawat (2003). The data presented in this paper suggest that the two approaches may actually be closer to each other than usually thought. The relative lack of market success in host triad regions can be interpreted, at least partly, as a reflection of the limited customer value attributed to home triad region FSAs, whether transferred through exports (FSAs embodied in final products), through licensing (FSAs transferred to foreign licensees), or through FDI (FSAs transferred to foreign affiliates, whether subsidiaries or hybrid units). In such cases the internalization question of optimal entry mode choice becomes redundant. In other words, it is only in locations where the MNEs home region FSAs are valued by customers, as compared with relevant rivals, and for which minimum sales volumes can be expected (at least as far as market-seeking FDI is concerned), that conventional internalization theory is fully relevant. In such case of easy market penetration there is no need for a lengthy learning process, in the sense of an incremental accumulation of host region experience, to compensate for the liability of foreignness. The case of easy market penetration is consistent with Vernons (1966) product life cycle (whereby all innovations with global market potential originate in one country), but with the choice of entry mode contingent upon transaction cost considerations. Paradoxically, internationalization theory identifies the locations where MNEs have the luxury of such an extensive, transaction-cost-driven entry mode selection and where they do not, namely in the case of high location-driven learning requirements. The data suggest that extensive choice options occur mainly in the home triad region, for most companies. Future research should therefore explore in more depth the complementarities, rather than the differences, between the internalization and internationalization perspectives on international expansion. Implications for research on the diamond of international competitiveness Porter (1990) has suggested that international competitiveness at the level of specific industries depends critically on a favorable configuration of home country diamond conditions. Here, four determinants have been viewed as critical: factor conditions (with a focus on created and advanced production factors) demand conditions (with a focus on total demand and sophistication of demand, based on precursor status) related and supporting industries (with a focus on the presence of world-class firms with which cluster type linkages exist) and strategy, structure and rivalry (whereby strong rivalry and benchmarking against the toughest competitors are critical to innovation). Porters perspective has led to several follow-up studies, providing extensions and suggestions to augment his path-breaking model ( Cartwright, 1993 Dunning, 1996 Moon et al. 1998 Rugman and DCruz, 1993 Rugman and Verbeke, 1993 Rugman et al. 1995 ). The data in this paper suggest two important extensions of research building upon the diamond concept. First, the diamond may be useful primarily to expand internationally in the home triad region, meaning that favorable diamond conditions in the home country may be insufficient in most cases to permit a truly global expansion. IB research should focus on the reasons for this lack of relevance of the home country diamond in host triad regions. Second, a limited geographic scope of the national diamonds significance for international competitiveness has asymmetric implications for large economies such as the United States, Japan, and Germany, and small open economies such as Canada, Belgium, and Singapore. For MNEs originating in large countries, it means reassessing the market attractiveness of the so-called small markets in the home triad region. The presence of FSAs instrumental to achieving a high market share in geographically proximate markets, but that are region bound, should refocus these MNEs efforts from assessing foreign market attractiveness through using macroeconomic data toward developing and using data that better indicate the firms real market penetration potential, as illustrated by the Tricon case discussed in Ghemawat (2001). As regards MNEs from small open economies, the data suggest that it makes sense to focus on demand in adjacent, large economies that are part of the home region. This is consistent with the double diamond thinking in IB research that focuses on MNEs in these small open economies, much in line with Moon et al. (1998). Rugman and Verbeke (1993). and Rugman et al. (1995). Here it should be emphasized that regional integration not only benefits MNEs in the form of creating supply side efficiencies, but also improves market integration on the demand side, for example in terms of positively influencing buyers confidence, attitudes and purchase intentions vis--vis products from foreign countries inside the triad region ( Agarwal et al. 2002 ). Here it would appear that, within one triad region, country of origin effects in purchasing decisions are complemented by region of origin preferences. Implications for research adopting a resource-based perspective on the integrationnational responsiveness framework Perhaps the most important implications of the empirical data on triad-based MNE activities are for research adopting a resource-based approach to MNE functioning. The integrationnational responsiveness framework, an application to the IB context of the differentiationintegration approach in organization theory ( Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967 ), was developed by Prahalad (1975). and further extended by Doz (1979). Bartlett (1979). and Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989). The integrationnational responsiveness framework was given a TCE and resource-based interpretation by Rugman and Verbeke (1992. 2001 ). The latter authors have argued that benefits of integration, in the form of scale economies, scope economies, and benefits of exploiting national differences, require non-location-bound FSAs. In contrast, benefits of national responsiveness require location-bound FSAs. In this revised model Bartlett and Ghoshals (1989) transnational solution could be interpreted as a firm that can effectively access and deploy the required dual knowledge bundles (of NLB and LB FSAs) for each activity to be performed, for each product, within each SBU. The data presented in this paper, however, suggest the need for an extension of the framework. The conventional framework needs to be augmented, as operating in the home triad region may be associated with new needs for the development of region-bound FSAs, imposed by regional integration: see for example the nine cases discussed by Rugman and Verbeke (1991). especially the Volvo Trucks case. Hence regional integration creates both a threat and an opportunity for MNEs as they need to complement the conventional bundles of non-location-bound FSAs and location-bound FSAs with a set of region-bound FSAs. The data in this paper suggest that many of the worlds largest and most international MNEs have been quite successful in doing so. In contrast, few of these firms appear capable of developing and deploying the required set of region-bound FSAs in host regions. The few cases where MNEs have been exceptionally successful in a host region (see Table 4 ) merit further attention. Here the focus should not be on those firms that acquired a position merely because of a merger (as in the DaimlerChrysler case), but on those where FSAs have really been built over time, for example by finding ways to access or plug in to pockets of new knowledge ( Doz et al. 2001 ). Many large MNEs do have a strong geographical dispersion of their sourcing and production, both in resource industries and in manufacturing, but appear incapable (or unwilling) of capitalizing on this position to achieve global sales penetration. The observed asymmetry between sourcingmanufacturing and sales has two critical implications. First, it means that the concept of location-bound vs non-location-bound FSAs needs to be extended. The former concept usually implies that profitable deployment is possible only in the home country. The latter concept assumes global transferability. The data suggest that many MNEs have FSAs that are region bound: that is, they can be deployed across national borders, but only in a limited geographic region. Here, value added through aggregation, in the sense of exploiting similarities across countries ( Ghemawat, 2003 ), can be achieved in the home region but appears difficult across regions. Second, the required MNEs FSAs in upstream activities to achieve global sourcing (of RampD outputs, raw materials, intermediate inputs, labor and capital) and production, may be very different from the FSAs required in downstream activities to achieve a global distribution of sales. Here, value added through arbitrage ( Ghemawat, 2003 ) that is, exploiting differences between countries appears to be achievable more often across regions. In this context, Figure 1 shows two hypothetical accumulation patterns over time, of the MNEs FSAs at the upstream end (sourcingproduction) and the downstream end (sales). At either end of the value chain these resource bundles consist of non-location-bound FSAs, location (read country)-bound FSAs and region-bound FSAs. The limited market performance achieved in host triad regions suggests that most firms are not capable of accessing and deploying the required knowledge bundles at the downstream end, because these bundles are likely to be quite different from the knowledge combinations effective in the home triad region, whereas this does not necessarily hold for more upstream activities. In broader terms, national and home region organizing principles adopted by MNEs, and engrained in their FSAs, appear to limit most MNEs repertoire of downstream strategies required to be effective in the host region market. This is particularly interesting given that many markets, especially for commodity products, are characterized by global (uniform) prices, driven by global competition. In contrast, it appears much easier to adopt effective sourcing (and manufacturing) strategies associated with a broad geographical coverage. The liability of foreignness faced by the MNE ( Hymer, 1976 Zaheer, 1995 ) thus needs to be unbundled into downstream and upstream components. Old and new perspectives on the largest 500 companies. The diagonal arrow in Figure 1 shows a hypothetical expansion path over time, whereby the FSAs available for effective global sourcingproduction (here in the sense of broad geographical coverage, but not necessarily limited to a triad context, as the optimal geographical configuration of sourcing and production is firm and industry specific) and those for global market penetration grow in very similar ways. In contrast, the arrow on the left-hand side of the diagonal in Figure 1 reflects a new perspective on the typical large top-500 MNE, which is trapped in its home triad region as far as market penetration is concerned. Here the development of downstream FSAs seriously lags behind the growth in upstream FSAs. It may thus be potentially easy to achieve a global distribution of sourcingproduction, whereas a global distribution of sales may be more difficult to accomplish. To a large extent, much of the recent work on the globalization of particular value chain functions, such as finance, RampD, purchasing and logistics, and production, has focused solely on the upstream portion of the MNEs FSA bundles. This largely reflects an arbitration issue, with the MNE taking advantage of the incomplete integration of factor markets ( Ghemawat, 2003 ). This may reflect a global logic in the minds of managers, but is distinct from a strong global market performance. Implications for research on MNE structure A large body of work has been written on the need for a fit between strategy and structure in MNEs, as a precondition for survival, profitability and growth, much in line with mainstream work in strategy and industrial organization on domestic firms. In this particular case the strategic importance of each triad region, combined with the different market characteristics faced by MNEs in each of these regions, would suggest the introduction of geographic components in the MNEs structure. The data in this paper, suggesting a strong discrepancy between intra-regional and inter-regional sales, may have important implications for MNE structure. In addition, the differentiation between downstream and upstream activities, building upon different sets of FSAs, should be reflected in the MNEs organizational structure, systems and perhaps even culture. Several papers have been written on regional components in MNE organizational structure, such as regional headquarters ( Daniels, 1987 DCruz, 1986 Dunning and Norman, 1987 Grosse, 1981 Heenan, 1979 Lasserre, 1996 Morrison et al. 1991 ). Yeung et al. s (2001) analysis of such regional headquarters in Singapore argues that their roles will depend on a number of parameters, which include geographical distance, familiarity with the host region, commitment to the host region, and regional integration, thus implicitly suggesting the importance of using the regional headquarters to complement in an idiosyncratic way each MNEs existing FSA bundles. More research is needed that links the required knowledge bundles for each critical value-added activity in host triad regions with specific structural elements, which may also include elements of organizational physiology and psychology ( Yeung et al. 2001 ). Here it should be recognized that such regional elements may increase the difficulty of managing multidivisional (M-form) companies, as performance evaluation should be differentiated for units operating in the various regions, even within similar businesses, given the enormous differences in environmental circumstances faced by the affiliates in each region. In other words, even at a single point in time, MNEs may adopt both participative decentralization and administrative centralization simultaneously. These two approaches have traditionally been viewed as inefficient corruptions of the M-form ( Freeland, 1996 Williamson, 1975 ), but may in reality constitute a precondition for the effective governance of MNEs with regional strategies. Here participative decentralization reflects the involvement of regional divisions in corporate strategic planning, and this may be critical for successfully conducting downstream activities in host regions, given both the relative lack of appropriate information at the corporate headquarters level on host regions, and the need to preserve subsidiary commitment and initiative in those host regions. In contrast, administrative centralization may be more appropriate for the management of upstream activities across regions, given the relative availability of information at corporate headquarters on these activities and the possibility of reducing both production and coordination costs through optimally exploiting imperfections in national and regional factor markets. Implications for research on the performance effects of geographical diversification Much of the literature on geographical diversification has attempted to evaluate the impact of diversification on profit performance ( Buckley et al. 1977. 1984 Geringer et al. 1989 Hitt et al. 1997 Morck and Yeung, 1991 Rugman, 1976 ). Usually some proxy is adopted for the share of foreign sales in total sales (or in some cases a more upstream end related measure, such as the number of subsidiaries abroad) to assess the degree of geographical diversification. Recent research has established the importance of the home country environment that is, the locus of origin of geographic diversification efforts for the scope and financial performance effects of geographic diversification ( Wan and Hoskisson, 2003 ). In this paper, however, we emphasize the importance of the locus of destination. The relative sales in host triad regions, vis--vis the home triad region, are themselves a critical performance parameter. Perhaps the mixed results in past research on the profit impact of geographical diversification, may be partly explained by (1) a lack of investigation of the locus of destination of the diversification efforts (intra-regional vs inter-regional), and (2) the fact that market share success in non-home triad markets may be at the expense of profit performance. Thus future research on the impacts of geographic diversification should study explicitly the regional patterns and scope of MNE sales growth. In addition, it could include relative sales in host region markets as a performance parameter (dependent variable), rather than as a mere independent variable affecting financial profitability. Recent work by Vermeulen and Barkema (2002) correctly points out that some benefits of international expansion (such as tax benefits, common purchasing, and improved access to inexpensive labor) are easier to realize than other benefits, which require learning. Although these authors do not view host region market penetration performance relative to home region performance as a proxy for international success, their work does suggest that a broader geographic scope of the expansion process negatively moderates the impact of a firms foreign subsidiaries on its profitability. More specifically, they demonstrate that a broader geographic scope strains the MNEs absorptive capacity ( Cohen and Levinthal, 1990 ), particularly in the short run, leading to time compression diseconomies. They also show that foreign expansion is easier to absorb for MNEs if it occurs in related countries, following the classification of countries into clusters developed by Ronen and Shenkar (1985) . Another recent paper by Ruigrok and Warner with a focus on upstream FSAs confirms this perspective. Ruigrok and Wagner (2003) suggest that US firms are usually characterized by an inverted J-curve, in terms of internationalization impact on performance (measured by return on assets). Internationalization is associated with performance improvements, until a threshold is reached, when performance starts to decline. The reason is that US firms usually expand in a first stage to culturally proximate countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia. In contrast, German firms face a U-curve in terms of performance effects of internationalization. A low psychic distance is found in only two small economies, namely Austria and Switzerland, which implies that German firms are required to target a much wider and more varied market (the EU) from the outset, thereby incurring higher learning costs. Ruigrok and Wagners (2003) perspective on upstream internationalization suggests that, even there, the linkages between country of origin and country of destination are critical in determining the optimal route of internationalization and organizational learning. This is an important observation, as influential work in IB has argued that the operational flexibility of MNEs, resulting from their internationally dispersed network of affiliates, confers arbitraging advantages, information-related network externalities, etc. ( Kogut, 1983 Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994 ). However, the analysis above suggests that the locus of destination determines the extent to which such benefits can be earned. More specifically, a lower (cultural, administrative, geographic and economic) distance, although reducing the hypothetical, maximum arbitraging and network externality benefits, will facilitate earning such benefits in practice. Future research should investigate whether the prior existence of a strong internal network in the home region (and the related proven ability to learn and to manage risks) is critical for subsequent positive performance effects of inter-regional expansion. The creation of a strong competitive position in the home region may reflect one step in an evolutionary strategy of resource recombinations, which follows a clear sequential pattern and creates platforms for future investments ( Kogut and Zander, 1993 ). However, it is unclear whether such platforms are themselves truly non-location-bound, or can only be applied in a limited geographic space. Conclusions Most large MNEs have an average of 80 of total sales in their home triad region. Only nine firms among the largest 500 companies are unambiguously global. What are the normative implications of this observation It could be argued that these few examples of global corporate success should be viewed as best practices and benchmarks, to be carefully studied, and emulated by other large MNEs, most of which are characterized by a much more narrow and shallow penetration of host region markets. However, the observed weak market position in host regions, as compared with the home triad market, may also be interpreted as the outcome of a rational preference for regionally based activities, resulting from a careful costbenefit calculation. Here, strategic interactions among large players, taking the form of inter-regional chess, may influence international sales patterns and the selection of target markets. More generally, it could be argued, from a co-evolutionary perspective, that regional strategies of MNEs are embedded in and co-evolve with the broader competitive, organizational and institutional contexts at the regional level, in the spirit of Koza and Lewin (1998). In this situation, MNE regional strategy choices evolve interdependently with changes in prevailing industry practices, legitimate organizational forms, government regulations, etc. It should be recognized that regions themselves may change over time (as with the inclusion of all the Americas in NAFTA and further EU expansion), and therefore provide new opportunities for MNE growth. The triad perspective developed in this paper should therefore be viewed as a starting point for future empirical analyses, recognizing that regionalization is open-ended over time. When globalization does occur, it is restricted to the upstream end of the value chain. Some of the worlds largest MNEs master the art of connecting globally dispersed inputs. These can be in the form of financial capital, human capital, RampD knowledge, components, etc. and can be integrated to better serve home region clients. Hence it appears possible to be global at the upstream end of the value chain, and much can undoubtedly be learned from observing and imitating the routines of global leaders in this portion of the value chain. Does this imply that large MNEs should be complacent as far as the downstream end is concerned and focus solely on their home region of the triad Probably not, but senior MNE management should understand that widespread geographic diversification may well have managerial pitfalls similar to the conventional drawbacks of product diversification. A clear focus is required in terms of scope of geographic expansion, and the economic evaluation of international growth plans must take into account the costs of inter-regional distance and the liability of inter-regional foreignness. Finally, this paper has uncovered two fundamental paradoxes of IB that so far have eluded most, if not all, scholars in the field. First, at the downstream end, national responsiveness and localized adaptation are almost universally advocated as a panacea for penetrating international markets, but in reality most MNEs attempt to add value primarily by capitalizing on similarities across markets. This is an aggregation strategy often met with success in the home region. Second, at the upstream end (including FDI-driven foreign manufacturing), opportunities for scale and scope are usually considered abundant. Yet, in reality, MNEs add value primarily through arbitrage that is, exploiting differences across nations and regions. Successful integration thus reflects locational specificities, and entails a process of internalization arbitrage . it refers essentially to the combination of the MNEs upstream FSAs, deployed in host countries, with these countries location advantages. We live in a world of semi-globalization, where IB research needs to rethink fundamentally the substance of aggregation and arbitrage opportunities. A renewed focus on MNE strategies, distinguishing between home and host triad regions, and between upstream and downstream activities, may be a good starting point for such an endeavor. Acknowledgements An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Duke University JIBS and CIBER Conference on Emerging Frontiers in International Business Research, 69 March 2003. We are pleased to acknowledge the help of Arie Lewin in stimulating this article. 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